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Abstract 
The role of judicial systems in determining economic per-
formance has gained increasingly attention in recent years. None-
theless, the literature lacks a clearly articulated framework to 
examine how judicial systems influence the investment and 
production decisions of economic agents. This paper tries to fill 
in this gap. It examines what constitutes a well-functioning 
judiciary, analyzes how dysfunctional judicial systems compro-
mise economic growth, and reviews the relevant empirical liter-
ature. It concludes with some remarks about why, despite the 
widespread perception that well-functioning legal and judicial 
systems are key to the success of market-oriented reforms in 
developing and transition countries, judicial reform has lagged so 
much behind other reforms. 
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"If efficiency is the fundamental problem of economists, justice is 
the guiding beacon of law professors. ... The difference between a 
discipline that seeks to explain economic life (and, indeed, all rational 
behavior) and a discipline that seeks to achieve justice in regulating all 
aspects of human behavior is profound. This difference means that, 
basically, the economist and the lawyer live in different worlds and 
speak different languages" [Stigler (1992, p. 462-463)]. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the interest in the role played by insti-
tutions in shaping economic development has grown steadily. 1 
 While many authors list them among the main determinants of 
growth, some go as far as singling them out, together with 
economic policies, as the most important determinant of a coun-
try's success in accomplishing economic development [North 
(1981) and Olson (1996)]. In fact, according to some estimates 
[Scully (1988)], countries with good institutions are twice as 
efficient and grow three times as fast, in per capita terms, as 
countries with poor institutional endowments. 
Among the institutions that most influence economic per-
formance, the legal and judicial systems play a prominent role. 
The rapid increase in the number of law and economics as-
sociations throughout the world attests to this recognition, as 
does the growing number of economics professors teaching in law 
schools. 2 There are essentially three ways through which law and 
economics may interact [Stigler (1992)]. First, economists may 
assist courts and lawyers in general in antitrust cases, in anti-
dumping and other types of foreign trade litigation, and policy-
oriented cases in general. 3 Second, economics helps understanding 
incentives to litigate, the process of litigation itself and the costs 
involved. This strand of the literature has also developed quite 
successfully in recent years, accompanying the rise in the num-
ber oflawsuits, the cost of trials and the size of the compensations 
awarded. 4 
A third area is analyzing the role of legal and judicial 
institutions in determining the pace and form of economic devel-
opment. What are the merits and flaws of different legal and 
1 See, for instance, Summers and Thomas (1993), Bruno (1995), Lin and Nugent (1995) and World 
Bank (1996). North (1990, p. 97) defines institutions as "the humanly devised constraints that 
structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints 
(sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal tales (constitutions, laws, 
property rights)... Together with the standard constraints of economics they define the choice set 
and therefore determine the transaction and production costs and hence the profitability and 
feasibility of engaging in economic activity." 
2 See, for instance, Van den Bergh (1996), Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) and Stigler (1992). 
3 As noted by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989, p. 1,068): "Policy-making courts need a behavioral theory 
to predict responses to changes in law and to evaluate these responses systematically according to 
a normative standard. Economics was able to provide both the behavioral theory and a normative 
standard that legal theory lacked." 
4 See Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) for a review of the literature on this subject. 
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judicial systems? What are their distributive impacts? How 
should legal and judicial systems be reformed in developing and 
transition economies to foster economic growth? Who are the 
beneficiaries and the opponents of judicial reform in these coun-
tries? These are all questions that economics can help to answer. 
In fact, the importance, even urgency, to answer them is currently 
widely acknowledged. As remarked by a well placed analyst, "es 
cada vez más amplio el consenso sobre la vinculación entre 
justicia y desarrollo económico" [Haussman (1996, p. 41)]. 5 In 
particular, as developing and transition economies adopt market-
oriented policies, such as trade liberalization and privatization, 
and many transactions formerly carried out inside large organi-
zations or under public sector coordination are being transferred 
to the market, enhancing the need for well-functioning judicial 
systems that protect and enforce rights and contracts. 6 
In contrast to the importance and urgency of the subject, 
the size of the literature on the role of judicial systems in fostering 
economic development is not large. Even more remarkable is the 
little progress that has been made so far with respect to measuring 
and testing the impact of the weakness of judicial systems on 
economic performance. As remarked by Sherwood, Shepherd and 
Souza (1994, p. 4): "Self-evident though it may seem, the propo-
sition that a strong judicial process enhances economic perfor-
mance is far from proven. The extent of that enhancement has 
not been estimated or even guessed at." 
This paper tries to fill in part of this gap. It has a dual 
objective. First, to develop an analytical framework that helps 
understanding how an inefficient judicial system compromises 
economic growth. Second, to review the literature on the relation 
between judicial systems and economic performance. Special 
attention is given to studies with empirical content. The paper is 
structured in five sections. Section 2 tries to establish what 
constitutes a well-functioning judiciary. Section 3 examines how 
judicial systems influence growth. Section 4 critically reviews the 
empirical literature. Section 5 concludes. 
2. What Is a Well-functioning Judicial System? 
Legal systems in market economies - or, as Cooter (1996) 
puts it, in rule-of-law states - establish the rules of the game and 
the mechanisms individuals may resort to enforce their rights. As 
5 See also The Economist (1996). 
6 As noted by Summers and Thomas (1993, p. 249): "The establishment of a well-functioning legal 
system and judiciary and secure property rights is an essential complement to economic reforms." 
Willig (1994, p. 156) notes that: -The first lesson is that in order to be effective, the divestiture of 
state-owned enterprises requires a suitable set of institutions. a suitable legal system, and a strategy 
that is tailored to the country's circumstances." 
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pointed out by Hay, Shleifer and Vishny (1996, p. 559), "[t]he rule 
of law means, in part, that people use the legal system to structure 
their economic activities and resolve disputes. This includes 
learning what the legal rules say, structuring their economic 
transactions using these tules, seeking to punish or obtain 
compensation from those who break the tules, and turning to the 
public officials, such as the courts and the police, to enforce these 
mies." In particular, economic law performs four major func-
tions. 7 First, it defines and protects property rights, particularly 
private rights. Second, it sets mies for trading those rights, not 
only among private agents, but also between these and the state. 
Third, it defines tules for entering and exiting the market. Fourth, 
it promotes competition and regulates behavior in sectors where 
monopolies prevail. In addition, as remarked by Sherwood, She-
pherd and Souza (1994, p. 6): 
"In market systems, the legal framework (ideally at least) will 
establish durable property rights which are difficult to alienate arbi-
trarily and provide means to assure those rights are clearly assigned 
across all property; allow substantial activity; allow substantial freedom 
for association in forming companies and, by allowing for limited 
liability, both encourage the raising of capital and provide for orderly 
dissolution of associations, firms, joint ventures and so on." 
No matter how good is a countrys legislation, it will not 
stand up by itself. To be effective, laws need to be supported by 
well-functioning enforcement and dispute-resolution institu-
tions. In this way, the courts play a central role in market 
economies, guaranteeing that the rule of law in fact applies. 
However, although the importance of well-functioning judiciaries 
in market economies is widely recognized, just how important 
they are is still an open issue. To advance in obtaining an 
estimate, it is important to articulate a description of how judicial 
system performance influences economic activity. In order to do 
that we need some benchmark of what constitutes a well-func-
tioning judiciary. Broad definitions like "a good judiciary is the 
one that ensures that justice is made and accessible to all, that 
laws and rights are respected and that all of these are properly 
enforced at a low cost to society" (e.g. Shihata, 1995, p. 14) 
capture the essence of the problem but are difficult to use. In 
particular, they require complex subjective judgments to resolve 
the trade-offs inherent in pursuing these various objectives. 
Stigler's (1992) remark, reproduced in the epigraph of this paper, 
gives an obvious signal of alert. Caution is also advocated by 
Sherwood, Shepherd and Souza (1994, p. 9): 
"Effective enforcement is inevitably a trade-off between justice, in 
terms of identifying the law, determining the facts, reaching a correct 
decision, setting a remedy and apportioning costs, and efficiency, in 
terms of the time and the public and private costs of conducting the 
litigation." 
In the same vein, Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989, p. 1,068) 
warn that while "[filie behavioral theory (that) treats laws, like 
7 World Bank (1996) and Gray et al. (1993), in Sherwood, Shepherd and Souza (1994). 
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prices, as incentives for behavior... has been well received... (and) 
[filie normative theory of efficiency is relatively uncontroversial... 
as a broad guide to policy... controversy is abundant when 
efficiency is seem as dominating other norms of fairness and 
j ustice. "8 
Defming precisely what is the "ideal" judicial system is 
difficult not only because it involves subjective judgments, but 
also because, as argued by Sherwood, Shepherd and Souza 
(1994, p. 7), the "line between a legal system and its judicial 
system is not self-evident." In particular, the courts' ability to 
provide fair, predictable and timely verdicts depends on laws 
being sensible, well written, and consistent with other laws and 
business practices. Contracts, too, whether between private par-
ties or involving the state, have to be properly drafted if courts are 
to function efficiently. Contracts need to be consistent with 
legislation and provide for verifiable and enforceable clauses. It is 
necessary, therefore, to have not only competent judges and 
legislators, but also well-prepared lawyers. This is bound to be a 
especially critical problem in transition economies. 9 In the 
remainder of this paper, I will often speak of judicial and legal 
systems as a single institution. 
Therefore, although finding a definition of what is a good 
judicial system is not difficult, selecting one that can be used for 
measurement purposes and that satisfies all tastes and ideologies 
is probably an impossible mission. Sherwood, Shepherd and 
Souza (1994, p. 7) propose, as an alternative, that one look 
instead at the results that the judiciary produces in terms of 
"assured access, predictable outcomes, timely outcomes, and 
adequate remedies." Hay, Shleifer and Vishny (1996, p. 560) go 
a step further, and suggest that the quality of a judicial system 
could be measured by observing the extent to which people resort 
to it rather than to competing mechanisms of conflict resolution 
and enforcement: "To be competitive, the legal system has to 
outcompete other, typically private, mechanisms of enforcing 
agreements and resolving disputes." 10 A similar but even more 
indirect means of assessment is advanced by Williamson (1995, 
p. 181-182): 
The upshot is that the quality of a judiciary can be inferred 
indirectly: a high-performance economy (expressed in governance 
terms) will support more transactions in the middle range [i.e., long-
term contracting outside hierarchical organizationsJ than will an econ-
omy with a problematic judiciary. Put differently, in a low-performance 
8 See also Dixit (1996, p. 13-15). 
9 As reported by the World Bank (1996, p. 93), "Nransition has brought a dramatic rise in the number 
of lawyers and the training opportunities open to them. In China, for example, the number oflicensed 
lawyers rose from only 3,000 over the entire 1957-80 period to more than 60,000 in 1995. Law school 
enrollments today exceed 30,000, and the government has announced a target of 150,000 lawyers 
by 2000. Improving legal education is also perceived to be an important element of judicial system 
reform in Latin America [Rowat, Malik and Dkolias (1995)]. 
10 The size of the informal sector is, in this sense, an indicator of how competitive is the country's legal 
and judicial systems. By operating outside the legal system, informal sector firms forego the right 
to be protected by the law and the courts. 
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economy the distribution of transactions will be more bimodal - with 
spot-market and hierarchical transactions and fewer middle-range 
transactions." 
I will look at the implications of Williamson's suggestion in 
the next two sections. Meanwhile, we may look at how the outputs 
of a judicial system affect the decisions of economic agents by 
focusing on the frequency of litigation. Note that a well-function-
ing judicial system is not necessarily one that is constantly in 
use. On the contrary, its role is to stimulate people to transact, 
while being confident that they may, if necessary, resort to the 
courts to enforce contracts and protect their rights. Therefore, we 
may assert that a good judiciary should not lead to either too 
much or too little litigation. 
A judiciary that leads to a lot of litigation is not being 
efficient on at least two accounts. One, because it is consuming 
too much resources, both by the litigants (lawyers etc.) and the 
public sector (e.g., judges, administrative personnel). Two, be-
cause it indicates that laws and rights are not sufficiently well 
defmed and/or respected. It is also probably a sign that the 
system is not being efficient in discouraging frivolous cases. On 
the other hand, too little litigation is also a sign that the judiciary 
is not performing well. No matter how well laws and contracts are 
transparent and well written, in practice one should expect 
litigation to occur, because there will always be contingencies that 
are hard for the parties to foresee (for instance, in a 50-year 
concession) or that are not contractible (car accidents etc.). Too 
little litigation is probably an indication that firms and individuais 
do not trust that the judiciary will efficiently protect their rights. 
It may also indicate that the costs of resorting to the judiciary are 
too high, in practice precluding universal access by the parties. 11 
Obviously, the optimal levei of litigation is dependent upon 
many factors, such as the nature of the legal system - common, 
Muslim, civil law etc. - the complexity of the economy (the 
production of knowledge, for instance, requires more legal pro-
tection than that of agriculture goods), the nature of capital 
ownership (in the state sector, litigation is resolved by admin-
istrative fiat), and the availability, cost and quality of alternative 
mechanisms. 12 Nonetheless, by examining how the outputs of the 
judicial system affect economic agents' decisions of whether or 
not to resort to the judiciary, we may advance on defining what 
constitutes a well-functioning judiciary. 
To understand the decision to litigate one has to see what 
is gained and lost when doing that. A person goes to court when 
the expected utility of doing so is larger than otherwise. In the 
same fashion, litigants resort to an out-of-court solution when 
11 In England, for instance, for claims below $31,000, the costs of litigation generally exceed the value 
of compensation awards [The Economist (1996, p. 47)). 
12 See, for instance, Gray (1991). 
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both parties' utility is larger in that circumstance than otherwise. 
Formally, let UN be the utility of not litigating; Uc the expected 
utility of resorting to court; and UA the expected utility of using 
an alternative mechanism. The dispute will not go to court if 
UN > max (Uc, UA) for both parties involved. An alternative 
resolution mechanism will be preferred if UA > max (Uc, UN) also 
for both parties. The outcome is undefined if for one party 
UN > max (Uc, UA) and for the other party UA > max (Uc, UN). In 
the remaining cases, the dispute will be taken to court. 13 Each 
party's utility may be expressed as: 
U = [Ag, 62] 
where: 
g = E(net gain) = E(gain) - E(cost of litigation); 
E(gain) = E[G/(1 + OTJ = p . V E[1 /(1 + 0 71; 
E[1/(1 + 0 71 = 	Pt/( 1 + t; and 
E(cost of litigation) = E[cA + C/(1 + 0 71 = cA + [pcG + (1 - 
- .13) cla [Et=i- pt/( 1  + 09. 
Ul > O and U2 is negative, equal to zero or positive depending 
on whether the person is risk averse, risk neutral or risk lover, 
respectively. 
In these expressions, G is the gross gain, a random variable 
that may assume values O or V, where V is the value of the 
property right in dispute. 14 The probability of winning is p and T 
is the number of periods until a decision is reached. T is also a 
random variable, with pt (t = 1, 2,...) being the probability that the 
cause is settled at t. I assume that the nature of the decision is 
independent of how long it takes to be reached. 
Since only after Tperiods the litigant will know whether he 
or she won the case (G = V) or lost it (G = O), the litigant will receive 
a right that has a present value equal to V/(1 + where i is the 
interest rate. The expected cost of litigation will depend in addition 
on cA, the cost of access, i.e. of using the specific dispute resolu-
tion mechanism, and on cG and cL, that reflect other costs in case 
of a favorable or unfavorable verdict, respectively. 15 In addition: 
13 The following analysis centers on how the quality of the judicial system affects the behavior of agents. 
Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) conduct a similar analysis centered on how the procedural rules, the 
perceptions of agents and the nature of the dispute affect the parties' behavior on the various stages 
of a legal dispute. 
14 "Property rights include the right to use an asset, to permit or exclude its use by others, to collect 
the income generated by the asset, and to sell or otherwise dispose of the asset. In market economies 
these rights are defined in law, usually in great detail" [World Bank (1996, p. 49)1. 
15 There are different ways to apportion litigation costs to the parties. In some countries each party 
pays its costs: in others, the party that loses bears all the costs. 
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a2  = Var(net gain) = Var(gain - cost of litigation) = 
= Var(G - C) El 1 /(1 + 0 271 + Var [1 /(1 + 01 [E(G - C)] 2 = 
= p(1 - [v - cG + cd 2 E[1/(1 + 0 21 + Var [1/(1 +0 T] [p. 
. (V- 	- (1 - cd 2 
The utility functions presented above may be adapted to 
three options presented before - resorting to the judiciary, using 
alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, or not litigating - by 
correctly fixing the value of parameters. One has to keep in mind, 
though, that the parameters have different meanings for each of 
the two parties - for instance, one's probability of winning is the 
other's of loosing. In addition, each party may make a different 
assessment of the parameters' values, even though in a well-func-
tioning judicial system these discrepancies should be small. 
Furthermore, it is worth stressing, judicial systems do not operate 
in an institutional vacuum. On the contrary, the performance of 
a country's judicial system will depend on its overall institutional 
structure, the legal system in particular. 16 
We may now use the model to see how a judicial system's 
outputs affect agents' decisions. There are four properties a 
well-functioning system should have: low cost access, fairness, 
and predictable and timely outcomes. 17 
The cost of using a dispute-resolution method depends on 
the value of access fees (cA), on how much one has to spend during 
the litigation process, on the probability of winning (which may 
itself depend on how much is spent), and on how litigation costs 
are apportioned (cG and cL). High court fees, expensive lawyers 
and corrupt judges will ali tend to encourage parties to use 
alternative mechanisms or simply not to litigate. A tension be-
tween justice and efficiency arises from the need to provide 
adequate remedies, and at the same time guaranteeing timely 
outcomes and low costs. 
Outcomes are predictable when the variance of the net gain 
is small. Note that this variance is formed both by the variance of 
the result and of the time it takes to reach a decision. Both are a 
16 Levy and Spiller (1994, p. 221) identify five different components of a country's institutional 
structure: 1) "Its legislative and executive institutions - the formal mechanisms for appointing 
legislators and decisionmakers, for making and implementing laws, and for determining the relations 
between these two institutions;" 2) "Its judicial institutions - the formal mechanisms for appointing 
judges and determining the internai structure of the judiciary and for impartially resolving disputes 
among private parties or between private parties and the state:" 3) "Its administrative capabilities:" 
4) "Custom and other informal but broadly accepted norms that tacitly constrain the actions of 
individuais or institutions;" 5) "The character of the contending social interests within a society and 
the balance between them, including the role of ideology." 
17 Sherwood, Shepherd and Souza (1994, p. 7-8) also include the possibility of remedying wrong 
decisions as an important desirable characteristic. In addition, "(w)hile it is difficult to give content 
to this prescription, the availability of precautionary measures to achieve immediate relief where 
warranted is certainly a component (of good judicial systems)." 
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bad and work as a disincentive to resorting to the judiciary. 
Predictability is high when p is Glose to O or 1 and Var(T) is small. 
Courts may be unpredictable because contracts and/or laws tend 
to be poorly written, because decisions are based on non-legal 
and uncertain criteria, because judges are incompetent or poorly 
informed, or because the parties are very uncertain about how 
long it will take until a decision is reached. Alternative dispute-
resolution methods may be preferred, therefore, not only because 
they are speedy, but also because arbitrators may be better 
prepared to interpret the issue in dispute. Casella (1996, p. 157), 
for instance, notes that despite being rather expensive, interna-
tional commercial arbitration is very popular among traders 
because laJrbitrators are considered more competent and more 
reliable than the courts,... an important side of arbitration is the 
possibility to give highly specialized judgments." 
A dispute-resolution system is fair when p is Glose to 1 for 
the right side and O for the wrong side. Partiality is clearly bad, 
and different from unpredictability, because it distorts the sense 
of justice in a deterministic and purposeful fashion. Courts may 
be biased due to corruption, because they are politicized (favoring 
certain classes of litigants, as elite members, workers, debtors, 
nationals etc.), or because they lack independence from the state, 
bending to its wishes when the government is a party in the 
dispute. 18 
In the model, a speedy dispute resolution method has a 
low value of E(7) . When justice is slow, the expected value of the 
gain will be lower the higher the rate of interest. 19 The failure to 
provide timely decisions is often cited as an important problem of 
judicial systems around the world. This, in turn, causes two sorts 
of related problems. On the one hand, it reduces the present value 
of the net gain, meaning that the judicial system only partly 
protects property rights. In high inflation economies, if proper 
indexing mechanisms are not adopted by courts, the value of the 
right in dispute may fali to zero rather rapidly. 2° This is a clear 
disincentive to resorting to courts. On the other hand, long delays 
in reaching a decision function as an incentive for the wrong party 
to file a lawsuit and avoid speedier systems of dispute resolution, 
leading to an even heavier load of cases in the judicial system. In 
this sense, with high rates of interest and a slow judiciary, the 
"right side" will have a disincentive to resort to court even if he 
18 This is the case, for instance, in Russia, where Arbitrazh courts are generally perceived as being 
impartial, except when the government is a party in the litigation (Ryterman et al. (1996)]. 
19 Note that i may be alternatively interpreted as a rate of time preference, which may differ from one 
agent to another. In either case, the present value will tend to differ among agents, since interest 
rates faced by distinct firms may also differ (small firms usually pay higher rates of interest). This 
may help to explain why large firms litigate more than small ones. Interest rates vary over time too, 
so that it may make less sense to litigate in certain times than in others. 
20 Even in low-inflation economies this may be important. In a recent article on the need of judicial 
reform in England, Th.e Econornist (1996) notes that "laJt present, insurance companies, in particular, 
often drag litigation out for years, knowing that the value of the settlement is being eroded by 
inflation." 
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has a high probability of winning. A situation like that will put 
strong incentives for the "wrong side" to go to court - for instance, 
when companies go to court against the payment of taxes 
although with a small chance of winning. Note, however, that if 
slowness is the only problem, it is possible to discourage such 
kind of behavior by fixing a low cG and a sufficiently high CL. 
A simpler version of the model will facilitate understanding 
the benefits of a well-functioning judiciary. Assume, for the sake 
of analysis, that T has a geometric distribution with the prob-
ability of a decision being reached in period one equal to e 
(T G(e)), 21 then:  
g = [p. V - pc G - (1 - p)cIJ/(i+e)- cA  
o2 = (p(1 - p) [V - CG + Cd 2 + i2(1 - e) 	(V CG) - 
- (1 - p) cd 2 	+ e)2}/[e  + 2i + i2] 
In addition, let us: 1) work with a simple first-order approx-
imation to the utility function, of the form U[g, 62] = g - aa; 2) 
assume that CG = cL = cV; and 3) suppose that CA is very small 
(= 0). In this case, the utility function simplifies to: 
U = O'Vjp - c] / ( + O) - aV ffp(1 - p) + eu - O) (p - c) 2/ 
/(i + 0) 2] [0/(0 + 2i + i2)]} 112 
In Figures 1 to 4, I show how utility changes with the value 
of p, for different values of i and O. Because in the simplified model 
U is proportional to V, we may assume without loss of generality 
that V = $1. In all figures the top (straight) line reflects the case 
of a risk neutral agent, and the middle and bottom lines increas-
ingly risk averse agents. Risk neutral agents are not affected by 
the lack of predictability of the judiciary, so we may concentrate 
on the top straight line to understand the effects of slowness, 
costs, and fairness. 
Note initially that the figures have different y scales, 
refiecting the fact that even when the probability of winning is 1, 
the utility is lower the higher the interest rate and the expected 
time until a verdict is reached (low O). In the least favorable case, 
in which e = 0.1 and i = 20 percent, a risk neutral agent would 
have an expected gain, in present value terms, of just $0.32. 
Slowness, however, would not significantly affect a risk neutral 
agent's decision to litigate or not, since Uc is positive even for very 
low values of p. Note, though, that while i and O determine the 
21 A drawback of the geometric distribution is that it is memoryless. That is, the probability of a cause 
being judged in period k, given that it was not judged until k - 1, is O, for all k. This, however, will 
not affect our results. 














slope of the curve, its intercept is equal to minus c. By comparing 
Figures 2 and 3, one may easily check that, even for not very high 
values of p, a speedy dispute-resolution mechanism with high 
costs may be preferable to a slow one with low costs. Fairness and 
costs are obvious determinants of the decision of whether or not 
to litigate. 
When the judiciary is not predictable, p is Glose to 0.5 
and/or Var(i) is high, leading to a large a2 , and reducing the 
utility of going to court. The effect of unpredictable decisions on 
utility may be assessed in Figure 2. In this case, because O is 
Figure 1 
Slow Judiciary and Low Interest Rates 
(O = 0.1, i = 0.08, c = 0.05) 
Figure 2 
Speed Judiciary and Low Interest Rates 
(e = 0.8, i = 0.08, c = 0.05) 
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-0.20   
Figure 3 
Slow Judiciary and High Interest Rates 
(O = 0.1, i = 0.2, c = 0.05) 
Figure 4 
Speed Judiciary and High Interest Rates 
(O = 0.8, i = 0.2, c = 0.05) 
large, Var(T) and E(7-) are relatively small, so that the vertical 
differences between curves reflect essentially the disutility of 
unpredictable decisions. In the case of very risk averse agents, 
this may be an important incentive not to litigate. As illustrated 
by the bottom line of Figure 2, a risk averse agent that had to pay 
fees of 5 percent of the value in dispute would not resort to the 
courts unless he had at least a 33-percent chance of winning. To 
assess the impact of Var(7), compare Figures 1 and 2, at the point 
p = 1. In Figure 2, in which O = 0.8, risk aversion is not an 
important factor, but in Figure 1, in which O = 0.1, the utility of 
the more risk averse agent is substantially lower than that of the 
risk neutral agent (0.38 against 0.53). 
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In addition, from the point of view of the party on the "right 
side" of the law, that is, the one that should receive V, a value of 
p Glose to 0.5 implies an expected gain below what he or she is 
entitled to. The same happens if Var(T) is large, even for high 
values of p, since in this case there is a sizable chance that the 
present value of the gain, if it happens, will be small (that is, 
unpredictable courts are also unfair courts). From the standpoint 
of the "wrong party", however, these are characteristics which 
stimulate the use of the courts. They mean that litigating is 
equivalent to exchanging a payment for certain for a lottery, with 
the possibility of a bonus if the decision is reached only in the 
very distant future. In this way, measures that make courts more 
predictable, like increasing the homogeneity of judges' decisions 
and raising the information content of previous decisions, lower 
the incentive of the wrong party to litigate. Another way to do this 
is by establishing high costs to the party that loses the cause. If 
the lack of predictability results solely from the value of T, a high 
enough cL will suffice to discourage the "wrong party" to litigate, 
while not significantly affecting the "correct side". However, if 
unpredictability results partially or totally from a value of p Glose 
to 0.5, a high cL will discourage both parties from resorting to the 
judiciary. 
In this way, causes may be started in good faith (to protect 
rights), but also in bad faith, exploiting the malfunctioning of the 
system. If courts are biased, the favored parties will have an 
incentive to litigate. If courts are slow or unpredictable, the "wrong 
parties" will have a tendency to litigate in otherwise unwarranted 
cases. For instance, in the concession of the right to explore the 
Rio-Niteroi bridge to11, 22 in 1995, the firm that lost the bid was 
able to postpone the conclusion of the process by appealing to 
higher courts, even lçnowing it had no chance of winning, simply 
to hurt its competitor. Lanjouw and Lerner (1996) show how the 
mechanism of injunctive relief is "successfully" used by financial-
ly strong firms to engage in predation against weaker companies, 
in this way settling disputes on favorable terms. Camargo (1996) 
shows how slowness and unpredictability (with respect to time) 
of Brazilian labor courts stimulate firms not to pay social contri-
butions due to employees, opting to settle the issue later in court. 
Although labor courts are perceived to be biased in favor of 
workers, because they take very long to reach a decision, workers 
usually agree to dose the litigation for a value much below the 
one they would be entitled to receive. These results help to explain 
why not only partial, but also slow and unpredictable judicial 
systems are bad both for justice and efficiency. 
Hay, Shleifer and Vishny (1996, p. 561) raise yet two other 
criticai issues, particularly in transition economies - verifiability 
and completeness: 
22 This bridge connects the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Niterói. in Brazil. 
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"[I]n a dysfunctional legal system, courts cannot effectively resolve 
contract disputes, even if they try, for two reasons. First, courts cannot 
easily verify whether a violation has taken place. For example, in the 
absence of standard accounting methods, courts cannot veri that one 
partner stole money from the other in their joint venture. Second, there 
is no body of law that specifies what a court should do even if there is 
a violation. For example, the Russian law does not specify who is liable 
when a buyer of securities discovers that these securities have been 
previously stolen (bonaftde purchaser rules do not exist)." 
Obviously, the ability of courts to enforce their decisions 
is another crucial requirement of a well-functioning judicial 
system. Enforcement depends on the coercive power of the state, 
but also on social norms and the quality of the law, both with 
respect to its transparency and as to whether it is perceived to be 
just. As with dispute-resolution methods, if the judicial system 
does not properly enforce the law, parties may resort to private 
mechanisms or just opt not to litigate. In Russia, for instance, 
"private enforcement methods are common, with their associated 
social and economic costs." Ryterman et al. (1996, p. 2) and World 
Bank (1996, p. 93) further notes that: 
"[Elven when judgments have been reached, the winners can find 
them difficult to enforce. In Vietnam, for example, fewer than 40 percent 
of court rulings in 1993 and 1994 were actually enforced, and up to 
half the judgments of Russian courts go unforced. These factors, 
combined with ingrained cultural attitudes toward the law, help to 
explain why so few private businesses want to use the courts to settle 
disputes, particularly in the NIS and East Asia." 
Some authors argue, however, that the role of public 
enforcement should not be overemphasized Shleifer and 
Vishny (1996)]. Laws and court rulings, even in the absence of 
proper enforcement by the state, offer guidelines that economic 
agents may use to structure their transactions and to privately 
enforce contracts. By the same token, Cooter (1996, p. 5) stresses 
the importance of social norms and the perceived fairness of laws 
as alternatives to state coercion: 
"As an economy develops and grows in complexity, officials need 
more information to enforce the law, and citizens need more information 
to obey it. By responding to social norms, state law loosens the 
constraints on information and motivation.... Because responsive law 
makes sense to citizens, officials can rely on their cooperation and 
informal enforcement efforts." 
The Russian Arbitrazh courts provide yet another instance 
in which enforcement relies more on social norms than on the 
coercive power of the state. Ryterman et al. (1996, p. 5) reports 
that Russian firms rely extensively on Arbitrazh courts, despite 
their lack of enforcement powers, because "an Arbitrazh court 
judgment, it seems, is viewed as a credible delineation of which 
enterprise is wronged.... Arbitrazh courts gain from a general 
perception of the legitimacy of their decisions, which perhaps 
explains why such decisions are quite often self-enforcing and 
why the threat of going to court can resolve disputes." 
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3. How do Judicial Systems Affect Economic Growth? 
There are only two ways to expand output: increasing the 
amount of inputs used in production and/or raising the produc-
tivity with which these inputs are used. Total factor productivity 
growth may, in turn, result from either technological progress, 
i.e., a shift in the frontier production function, or an increase in 
the efficiency with which the available technology is used. In this 
way, if one wants to understand why some countries are poor and 
others rich, or why some grow more than others, it is on these 
components that one has to center one's attention. 
The literature on cross-country differences in economic 
performance is extensive and reviewing it is way beyond the scope 
of this paper. 23 It is enough to note here that differences in public 
policies and institutions are currently recognized as one of the 
key explanations for the large differences in levels and growth 
rates of per capita GDP among countries [North (1981 and 1990) 
and Barro and Lee (1994)]. To some, it is not only an important 
cause, but the most important one [North (1981) and Olson 
(1996)]. In fact, for Olson (1996, p. 20), reforming economic policy 
and institutions is sufficient for rapidly getting a country into a 
high growth track: "But any poorer countries that adopt relatively 
good economic policies and institutions enjoy rapid catch-up 
growth..." 
Olson's arguments are given empirical content by Scully 
(1988), who analyzed the impact of institutions on the efficiency 
levels and growth rates of 155 market economies. Scully reaches 
three main conclusions. First, countries with good institutions -
that is, "politically open societies, which bind themselves to the 
rule of law, to private property, and to market allocation of 
resources" - grow three times as fast, in per capita terms, as 
countries with poor institutions (2.73 to 0.91 percent annually). 
Second, countries with poor institutions are only half as efficient 
as those with a good institutional framework. Third, countries 
with poor institutions tend to show a continuous decline in 
efficiency, whereas those with good institutions have already 
captured all efficiency gains, so that in these countries "one 
should not expect an improvement in efficiency over time." 
The institutions Olson (1996, p. 6) calls attention to com-
prise "the legal systems that enforce contracts and protect prop-
erty rights and... political structures, constitutional provisions, 
and the extent of special-interest lobbies and cartels." The impor-
tance of well-functioning judicial systems is stressed by North 
(1992, p. 8): 
23 On this subject, see, for instance, Barro (1991). Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Levine and Renelt 
(1992), Romer (1994), Barro and Lee (1994), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Bernard and Jones 
(1996) and Sala-i-Martin (1996). 
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"Indeed, the difficulty of creating a relatively impartial judicial 
system that enforces agreements has been a critical stumbling block 
in the path of economic development. In the Western world the evolution 
of courts, legal systems, and a relatively impartial system of judicial 
enforcement has played a major role in permitting the development of 
a complex system of contracting that can extend over time and space, 
an essential requirement for economic specialization." 
According to the supply-side growth decomposition 
suggested above, well-functioning judiciaries may foster growth 
through essentially three different channels: technological 
progress, investment and high efficiency. Next, I examine each of 
these channels individually. 
Technological Progress 
Good legal and judicial systems may stimulate growth by 
protecting intellectual property, and in this way fostering techno-
logical progress and absorption. 24 There are two different mecha-
nisms that could produce this result. One, less developed 
countries with stringent intellectual property legislation may find 
it easier to buy advanced technology from firms in industrialized 
countries, whether embodied or not in capital goods. Two, by 
encouraging domestic firms to invest in R&D. Some evidence in 
that direction is provided by Gould and Gruben (1996), who use 
cross-country regressions to analyze the impact of intellectual 
property rights on growth, while controlling for trade regime and 
different country-specific characteristics. Their results suggest 
that countries that protect intellectual property grow faster 
than the ones that do not, and that this effect is slightly more 
pronounced in open economies. Mansfield (1994 and 1995) finds 
empirical evidence that the strength of a country's system of 
intellectual property protection appears to influence its ability to 
attract American, German and Japanese investment and tech-
nology to high-technology industries. 25 
Furthermore, timely and consistent enforcement of private 
contracts reduces transaction costs and stimulates economic 
agents to increase the number and breadth of their market 
transactions. This, in turn, leads to a wider diffusion of knowl-
edge, including not only technological spillovers, but also the 
transmission of sound managing, marketing and financing prac-
tices. Two other mechanisms operate through the stimulus pro-
vided by the market-enlargement effect of low transaction costs. 
One, as the size of the market increases firms face stiffer compe-
tition. Two, a larger market means that more sales and profits 
could be made out of a specific innovation. Both mechanisms will 
24 Interestingly, this possibility is downplayed by Olson, to whom "the world's productive knowledge 
is, for the most part, available to poor countries, and even at a relatively modest cost. It would be 
very difficult to explain much of the differences in per capita incomes across countries in terms of 
differential access to the available stock of productive knowledge" (Olson (1996, p. 8)). 
25 These conclusions are not, obviously, free from controversy. Heipman (1993), for instance, uses a 
different methodology to show that whereas tight intellectual property rights may advance the 
interest of industrialized countries, it may not in general benefit developing countries. 
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tend to encourage firms to innovate, either by developing or 
acquiring technology. 26 
Investment 
Another way well-functioning judicial systems foster 
growth is by stimulating a more rapid accumulation of factors of 
production. In particular, investment in both physical and hu-
man capital will be encouraged by secure property rights, well-
functioning legal and judicial systems and political stability 
[Schmidt-Hebbel, Servén and Solimano (1996) and Alesina and 
Perotti (1994)]. In the case of rights that depend on a grant from 
the state, such as land, intellectual property and the right to 
explore mineral resources or other public concessions, poor 
enforcement and the risk of administrative expropriation reduce 
the expected value of the property right and, therefore, the returns 
on new investment. Dysfunctional judicial systems may also 
discourage savings and stimulate capital flight, reducing the 
volume of funds available to fmance investment. 
As noted by Williamson (1995, p. 182), the impact of poor 
judicial systems on investment in physical and human capital 
will be larger the more specialized and specific is the nature of 
this investment: 
"Nations that pose severe investment hazards will support smaller 
amounts of specialized, durable investment ... than will more credible 
investment regimes; nations with problematic judiciaries will be simi-
larly disadvantaged. That will show up in technology. Regimes that 
afford weak supports for investment and contracting will rarely be able 
to provide strong supports for intellectual property rights. High-tech-
nology industries or industries that benefit from specialized, durable 
investments will thus flee from regimes with great investment and 
contractual insecurities - for safer havens." 
The reason for that is articulated by Makler (1996, p. 4-8). 
Private agents will only make long-term and highly specialized 
investments if they are secure that the contracts that support 
their activities will be properly enforced. Because specialized 
production often requires transaction-specific assets, contracts 
that support it are usually affected by the ability of the parties to 
exit the agreement. Legal restrictions may also limit the ability of 
the parties to freely dispose of their assets. 27 Long-term contract-
ing, on the other hand, suffers from the difficulty of the parties, 
at the time of contracting, to forecast and address all possible 
contingencies that may arise during the life time of the agreement. 
Because they were not predicted beforehand or were too costly to 
contemplate in the contract, contingencies have to be dealt with 
as they arise, requiring both parties to exercise some degree of 
discretion during the operation of the contract. Hay, Shleifer and 
26 The mechanisms at work here are similar to those discussed by Grossman and Helpman (1992. 
particularly Chapter 9) in the context of foreign trade. 
27 "For instance, the new Brazilian Concession Law precludes the private investor from disposing of 
the concession without permission of the granting power" (Makler (1996)1. 
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Vishny (1996, p. 561) note that contracts may also be incomplete 
if they contemplate clauses the courts cannot verify and rule on. 
In all these cases, one or both parties will have an incentive 
to behave opportunistically; i.e., seek its self-interest with guile: 
"While it is reasonable to expect parties to pursue their own 
self-interest... the guile component addresses the propensity of a 
party to abrogate or depart from the original bargain in pursuit 
of his self-interest" [Makler (1996)]. Well-functioning judicial 
systems, broadly understood to contemplate the drafting of con-
tracts and the existence of accounting methods that allow veri-
fiability by courts, are essential to reduce contractual hazards. 
Especially when the state is a part in the agreement, strong and 
independent judiciaries will be essential to stimulate economic 
activities that involve specific investment. 
The country studies summarized in Levy and Spiller (1994) 
clearly indicate that in sectors with specific investment - that is, 
investment that cannot be salvaged for other purposes - a strong 
and independent judiciary is a necessary condition for the partic-
ipation of private investors. In countries where judiciaries are 
weak, laws are unstable and administrative discretion common, 
investment in these sectors will only take place if undertaken by 
the state. In this way, malfunctioning judicial systems lead either 
to lack of investment or to usually dysfunctional public produc-
tion. The telecommunications sector, as exemplified by Levy and 
Spiller (1994, p. 218-219), illustrates the problem well: 
"Establishing a telecommunications network involves large sunk 
investments because assets have very low alternative, or salvage, value. 
Consequently, utilities are particularly vulnerable to administrative 
expropriation, with regulators setting prices below long-run replace-
ment costs so as to capture the quasi-rents (returns above the oppor-
tunity cost when a good is temporarily in short supply) associated with 
the operation of those assets. Firms end up with incentives to invest 
less than socially optimal." 
A simple model will help understanding the importance of 
judicial systems to foster investment in cases in which asset 
specificity is important. Suppose that to fulfill a contract a firm 
has to invest $1 and as a result will receive a return of r dollars 
per period. If there is no risk that the other party in the contract 
will behave opportunistically, the flow the firm will receive in 
exchange for its investment has a present value of r/ i, where i is 
the interest rate. Therefore, the firm will enter the contract if r > i. 
Suppose now that because of asset specificity, there is a 
probability 7C that the other party will behave opportunistically. 
Assume that because exit for the firm is limited, the other party 
may expropriate a proportion a of the firm's return. Alternatively, 
(1 - a) may be seen as the salvage value of the firm's investment. 
In this case, the expected present value of the firm's return on the 
investment is 1(1 - ir) r + IC ( 1 — a) ;Ui. In this case, the firm will 
only engage in the contract if r > i/(1 - na). That is, the firm will 
Ensaios BNDES ng 2 	 23 
require a higher rate of return, to accommodate for the risk of 
expropriation. This risk premium will be higher the larger the 
values of E and a. 
If the firm may resort to the courts to enforce its contract, 
then it may avoid or at least limit the extent of expropriation. 
Suppose, as we did in Section 2, that the firm has a probability 
p of winning the case, that a decision will be reached after T 
periods, and that litigation costs amount to a proportion c of the 
right in dispute. In this case, the expected present value of the 
firm's return on the investment is: 
(r/0 (1 - na - p(1 - a)7c + E (p(e + i(1 - a)(1 - e)) - cae]/(i + e)} 
Table 1 gives the value of the minimum rate of return the 
firm would accept, for different values of the parameters. If the 
judiciary is fair, predictable and fast, and litigation inexpensive 
(p high and e and c low), and interest rates are not high, the firm 
will accept a rate of return (r) only slightly higher than the interest 
rate (0. Even in the worst situation presented in Table 1 (p = 0.5, 
e = 0.1 and i = 20%), however, the judiciary still contributes to 
reduce the minimum acceptable rate of return, as compared with 
the case in which there is no recourse to third-party enforce-
ment. 28 
Table 1 
Impact of Judiciary on Premium Over Interest Rate (r/i - 1, in percent) 
(E = 0.5, a = 0.5, c = 0.05) 
P 0 = 0.8 	 0 = 0.1 
i = 8% i = 20% i = 8% i = 20% 
0.9 8 13 17 24 
0.7 13 17 20 26 
0.5 19 22 24 28 
Efficiency 
Finaily, malfunctioning judicial systems hamper growth by 
stimulating an inefficient use of resources and technology, mov-
ing countries away from their potential or best practice output. 
High risk and large transaction costs move the country's price 
system away from international standards, distorting resource 
allocation. Because contract and property rights are not properly 
enforced, firms may decide not to pursue certain activities, forego 
the opportunity to specialize and exploit economies of scale, mix 
inputs inefficiently, not allocate production among clients and 
markets in the most efficient fashion, keep resources unemployed 
etc. Efficiency may also be affected if weak judicial performance 
28 Note that the model does not consider the disutility embedded in the unpredictability of the judiciary, 
as done in Section 2. If that was introduced in the model, the required rate of return would increase. 
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segment markets to an extent that competition is significantly 
reduced. 
A simple model will help understanding the impact ofweak 
judicial systems on the price system and, as a consequence, on 
economic efficiency. Assume a firm caters to a market with two 
types of clients. Type 1 clients abide entirely to the contract and 
provide a return to the firm of r for the service provided. Type 2 
clients always abrogate the contract. In this case the firm has to 
renegotiate the contract and is able to salvage a return of r(1 - a), 
net of renegotiation costs. The firm does not know who is a client 
of which type, but knows that a proportion 7C of its customers are 
of type 2. 29 Using the standard capital-asset-pricing model, we 
have that in this case the firm will fix its price to obtain an 
expected rate of return given by: 
E(return) = i + aar 
where: 
i is the risk-free rate of return; 
E(return) = (1 - 7c) r + 7C ( 1 — a) r = r (1 - an); and 
ar2 = r2a27c(1 - 7r). 
From which follows that the firm will operate with a rate 
of return equal to: 
r = i/[1 - an(1 + a/(1 - n)/n)[ 
It is clear from the above expression that r/i will be higher 
the larger the values of a, 7r and a. While a reflects risk aversion, 
a and n are characteristics of the firm's market, which will be 
influenced by the quality of the judicial system in two interrelated 
ways. First, note that instead of renegotiating the contract, the 
firm may try to enforce it in court. The utility of doing this is given 
by U, as established by the model in Section 2. In this way, the 
above model may be more properly specified by substituting 
max (U, 1 - a) for 1 - a in the above expressions. Obviously, 
because clients of type 2 know that the firm will go to court 
otherwise, they will offer to renegotiate at a value of 1 - a equal 
to or higher than U. In this case, a will fall in the interval defined 
by 1 - a Uf and a > U2, where Uf and U2 are the utilities of 
litigating for the firm and clients type 2, respectively, if this is not 
an empty set. Second, the value of a and the possibility of being 
penalized by the courts, as well as culture and social norms, will 
determine the value of 7Z. In the limiting case, a good judiciary 
29 This model is essentially indistinguishable from another in which a proportion b of the firm's 
customers are type 2 and each has a probability e of reneging the original contract. For that, just 
substitute b.e for rt in the following expressions. 
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would reduce the value of a to an extent that IC would become very 
small. 
Table 2 gives the value of the premium over the risk-free 
rate of return required by the firm for different values of the 
parameters. Although this premium is low - that is, under 10 
percent - for relatively low values of a and 'TC, which would prevail 
in case of a well-functioning judiciary, it increases quite signifi-
cantly for high values of these parameters. 3° As the nature of the 
firms' markets differs, the value of this premium will also vary. 
Therefore, malfunctioning judiciaries reduce efficiency by dis-
torting the price system. 
Table 2 
Risk Premium Due to Nonperforming Clients (r/i - 1, in percent) 
n = 0.2 it = 0.5 TI = 0.8 
a = 0.2 6.8 14.9 22.6 
a = 0.3 a = 0.5 19.1 48.2 85.2 
a = 0.8 34.4 108.3 278.8 
a = 0.2 9.7 19.1 26.3 
a = 0.6 a = 0.5 28.2 66.7 108.3 
a = 0.8 54.3 177.8 495.2 
Although the model assumes that the firm is the one being 
expropriated, this need not be the case. In fact, particularly in 
developing countries, producers breach contracts with frequency. 
Firms sell goods that do not have the quality advertised, private 
concessionaires provide services that do not attend ali the 
specifications of the concession contract etc. Because litigation 
is costly, consumers and/or the government may decide not to 
persecute. Klein and Leffler (1981) develop a model that shows 
that in case of repeated transactions and non-monopolistic mar-
ket structures, self-enforcement is possible if consumers commu-
nicate at low costs and the price is sufficiently high. In this case, 
the firm earns a rent, in the form of a premium over prices that 
would prevail with perfect third-party enforcement, which it loses 
in case of breach, and that works as an incentive for self-enforce-
ment. 
Another obvious way dysfunctional judicial systems reduce 
the economy's efficiency levei is by direct consumption of scarce 
resources. Litigation demands lawyers, time and attention from 
the parties and a well staffed judiciary. These are highly special-
ized services, and society has to spend sizable resources to train 
and educate judges, lawyers and other personnel involved. There 
are three additional related sources of inefficiency. One, that 
incurred by private agents while learning and keeping abreast 
30 Note that these results suggest that the premium is more sensitive to Lhe value of a than to that of E. 
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with the more cumbersome legislation that tends to substitute for 
weak judicial systems. The public sector, too, frequently has to 
maintain a large bureaucracy to process and supervise applica-
tion of this legislation. Two, dysfunctional judicial systems, es-
pecially when inclined to pronounce politicized verdicts, stimulate 
rent seeking and lobbying by interested parties. 
Three, resources are consumed by economic agents while 
providing and using private mechanisms that substitute for a 
well-functioning judiciary or allow circumventing the problems 
created by weak enforcement. Firms spend resources to screen 
clients and suppliers. Contracts between private parties and with 
the government become at the same time more difficult to write -
because less room is left to third-party interpretation - and less 
important in transacting. In addition, as noted by Sherwood, 
Shepherd and Souza (1994, p. 14), administering "contracts is 
also more complicated in a weak enforcement system since there 
is a prominent need to monitor performance closely in the absence 
of the unspoken discipline which strong enforcement mecha-
nisms impose." On the other hand, because the cost of enforcing 
these contracts is so high, firms may constantly renegotiate or 
just abandon them if the other party does not comply. The 
Russian experience illustrates this point well [Ryterman et al. 
(1996, p. 4)]: 
	
"Many elements of contracts are not implemented 	The quantity 
and timing clauses of contracts seem irrelevant. Similarly, prices are 
entered into contracts only to be the object of renegotiation at the time 
of implementation. When a supplier demands a higher price. customers 
regard this as normal practice. Customers either pay or walk away 
from the contract. Court action for breach does not seem to be contem-
plated under such circumstances." 
In the presence of dysfunctional legal and judicial systems 
economic agents may opt to keep existing production capacity 
partly or fully unemployed. Holden and Rajapatirana (1994, p. 
51) note for instance that: 
"[In Uruguayi the market value of real estate when occupied is 
about half what it would be if unoccupied. There are a large number of 
unoccupied housing units in Montevideo because owners do not want 
to rent them for fear of not being able to recover their properties without 
large costs. Brazilian real estate suffers from a similar complaint. It is 
difficult to rent apartments in Rio de Janeiro because of problems 
associated with terminating rental contracts." 
Credit markets, because they are so sensitive to adverse 
selection and so dependent on third-party enforcement, tend to 
be particularly affected. As noted by Sherwood, Shepherd and 
Souza (1994, p. 15), Iploor enforcement makes loan guarantees 
difficult to collect and, by extension, hinders commercial lending 
in capital markets." In addition, when governments are perceived 
to influence courts, firms will tend to shy away from dealing with 
the public sector and charge an overprice when they do. In many 
settings, difficulty to enforce contracts with the government will 
stimulate corruption among politicians and public officials and 
lower competition in public procurement. 
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An inefficient judiciary, particularly one that is politicized, 
may also lead to an inefficient use of inputs. In Brazil, for instance, 
because courts tend to favor labor over capital, firms hire fewer 
workers than would be warranted by the cost of labor. Firms may 
also opt to locate in cities or states were they trust the judiciary, 
even though other locations could make more sense from a purely 
financial perspective. In the same vein, weak judicial systems may 
preclude more complex transactions and force firms into rather 
inefficient forros of trading [Ryterman et al. (1996, p. 13)]: 
"One of the most important features of the Russian economy is that 
payments are dominated by mechanisms that are very costly to imple-
ment... (one is) the reliance of firms on prepayment as a method for 
ensuring contractual performance.... (the other is) barter. Barter is an 
institutional feature that appears to have reached epidemic proportions 
in Russia. We believe that the high incidence of barter is a direct 
consequence of... underdeveloped financial markets, which have re-
sulted in very high real rates of interest, and an underdeveloped legal 
system, in which tax policy fails to be supported by appropriate social 
norms and institutions ... The average reported share of barter in sales 
was 40 percent in 1996 compared with a 1992 share of 5 percent." 
Still another way dysfunctional legal and judicial systems 
reduce efficiency is by encouraging firms to vertically integrate, 
in this way reducing the levei of specialization in the economy and 
preventing the full exploitation of economies of scale and scope. 
An example is reported in Ryterman et al.'s (1996, p. 15) analysis 
of the Russian experience: "In some cases, firms are able to 
accommodate the failure of the legal and financial systems by 
changing the boundaries of their firms. We observed some ten-
dency for firms to vertically integrate downwards. Firms that 
supply the consumer market report that they are expanding their 
operations into retail outlets in order to increase the reliability of 
payments." 
The reasons why malfunctioning judicial systems dis-
courage technological progress, factor accumulation and efficiency 
concern threats to property rights and risk of opportunistic 
behavior from economic agents in general. Nonetheless, most of 
the literature concentrates in the role of judicial systems in 
constraining government discretion in three interrelated ways: 1) 
securing property rights against administrative expropriation; 2) 
reducing policy instability; and 3) increasing the flexibility and 
credibility of economic policy. I turn to these next. 
Securing Property Rights against Administrative 
Expropriation 
The most oft-cited channel through which functional judi-
cial and legal systems stimulate growth is by protecting private 
property rights from administrative expropriation. The risk of 
expropriation arises from the fact that the state, as any party in 
a contract, has an incentive to behave opportunistically. Also as 
in any contract, the risk is higher the more specific is the 
investment the other party has to make to fulfill its side of the 
bargain. What makes the state so special is the monopoly of legal 
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coercion given to it by society, which increases its degrees of 
freedom to unilaterally change the terms of the contract or not 
abide by them, while still not brealçing the law. 31 Therefore, while 
contracts may specify clauses aimed at constraining government 
opportunism, transacting with the public sector is particularly 
dependent on the protection awarded by an independent judiciary. 
Levy and Spiller (1994) deal extensively with the problem 
of administrative expropriation in the case of telecommunications 
and public utilities in general, in which the risk of opportunistic 
behavior by the state is particularly high, due to asset-specificity 
and long-term contracting. 32 Based on the analysis of flve country 
experiences, Levy and Spiller (1994, p. 216) conclude that: "A 
necessary condition for sustained and large-scale private invest-
ment in utilities is that administrative arbitrariness on the part 
of government be restrainable." In that respect, the study conveys 
two key messages: one, well-functioning judicial systems are 
necessary to limit administrative discretion; and two, they are not 
a sufficient condition. 
As pointed out by Coase (1988, p. 27), governments in-
fluence the actions of economic agents by changing the law 
and/or its administration. Economic policy consists, in this 
sense, "of choosing those legal rules, procedures, and adminis-
trative structures which will maximize the value of production." 
There are, however, two different levels of economic policy. One, 
parallel to what Levy and Spiller (1994) call detail regulation, 
comprises the laws themselves, as defined in Section 2 of this 
paper. The other, akin to Levy and Spillers basic regulation, 
consists of the substantive and procedural constraints used by 
society to make firms less vulnerable to administrative discretion 
and more inclined to invest. 
To limit governments' incentives and freedom to behave 
opportunistically, countries resort to three mechanisms. First, 
they constrain the discretion with which the state may administer 
the law, by setting limits in the law itself or in other legislation. 
Second, they establish rules limiting the ability of governments 
to change the law and the constraints imposed by it. Third, they 
create independent and strong institutions that enforce these 
substantive and procedural constraints on administrative discre-
tion. 
Obviously, neither the restrains built into the law, nor 
those constraining the government's ability to change the law, 
cany any commitment unless enforced by an efflcient, impartial 
and powerful judiciary. It is not surprising, therefore, that Levy 
31 As remarked by Dixit (1996, p. 49): "The power to coerce raises the danger of its misuse. Although 
the intention of the constitution is that such force, or its threat, should serve the general interest, 
nothing can guarantee that once an agency is given the state's monopoly of force, it will not use this 
power in pursuit of its own interests." 
32 See also Makler (1996). 
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and Spiller (1994, p. 233) conclude that la]ll three countries 
whose regulatory systems have successfully constrained the 
discretionary power of regulators have independent and well-re-
garded judiciaries." 
A second key message in Levy and Spiller (1994) is that 
well-functioning judicial systems are a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition to effectively protect property rights from adminis-
trative expropriation. This because if the law imposes few limits 
on administrative discretion, or there are no stringent constraints 
on changing the law, there is little judiciaries may do. A particu-
larly unfavorable situation is the one in which the executive 
branch of government is able to largely influence the legislative 
agenda, either because it has legislative powers, or because the 
same party controls the executive and legislative branches of 
government. In these cases, even if the judiciary impeded the 
opportunistic behavior by the government in one instance, the 
latter could get its way by simply changing the law. An important 
conclusion from Levy and Spillers (1994, p. 230) case studies was, 
therefore, "that private utilities were willing to make sustained 
investments only when ali three components of restraint worked 
adequately." 
Improving the Quality and Reducing the Instability of 
Economic Policy 
The importance of sound and stable macroeconomic policy 
to economic development has been well emphasized in the litera-
ture. 33 Recently, however, Borner, Brunetti and Weder (1992) 
have argued that the emphasis on macroeconomic instability has 
been excessive. Institutional uncertainty, resulting from volatile 
and highly discretionary economic policy, make the "rules of the 
game" very unstable, discouraging investment and production. In 
addition, because the effect of policy instability on markets is not 
neutral, it distorts resource allocation and reduces incentives for 
specialization. As discussed above, well-functioning judicial sys-
tems contribute to reduce policy instability by upholding specific 
legislative or constitutional commitments and constraining 
administrative discretion. 
Dysfunctional judicial systems not only reduce the stabil-
ity of economic policy, but also its quality. In countries where legal 
and judicial systems do not perform well, economic policy tends 
to be more interventionist. As noted by Gray (1991, p. 775), 
Ic]ertain forms of direct regulation and government policies of 
intervention in the marketplace in developing countries can be 
seen at least in part as substitutes for an independent, well-func- 
33 Bleaney (1996), for instance, concludes that "policy-induced macroeconomic instability is an 
important negative influence on investment and growth in developing countries." An interesting 
conclusion that arises out of Bleaney's (1996) results is that sound macroeconomic policies affect 
growth essentially by raising the productivity of capital, while not showing a clear impact on the rate 
of investment. 
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tioning legal system." The widespread presence of state-owned 
enterprises in different sectors of developing economies is a telling 
example. In most cases, state enterprises substitute for private 
investment, which was absent because governments failed to 
provide a credible commitment that they would not expropriate 
investment in these activities. 
Another instance of low quality economic policy due to 
malfunctioning judiciaries arises in the fiscal area. Weak en-
forcement encourages tax evasion, which is pervasive in many 
developing countries. To maintain the levei of tax revenues, gov-
ernments resort to low yield and highly distortionary taxes, 
compromising economic growth. In addition, since not ali tax-
payers have the same opportunity to evade taxes, poor enforce-
ment will also have an important distributive impact. 
Increasing the Flexibility and Credibility of Economic 
Policy 
When defining how rigid the substantive and procedural 
constraints imposed on administrative discretion should be, 
countries have to address a basic trade-off. On one hand, the 
stimulus provided by the legal system to investment will increase 
with the strength of the restrictions imposed on government 
discretion. Because most investment in an economy carnes some 
degree of asset-specificity, governments will be permanently 
tempted to behave opportunistically. The more degrees of freedom 
allowed to economic policy, the higher will be this risk. From that 
perspective, laws should be detailed, rigid, hard to change and 
self-contained. On the other hand, because circumstances in 
which the economy operates change over time, economic policy 
may only be efficient if governments enjoy some fiedbility in 
administering the law. In a rapidly changing environment, a legal 
system that permits wide adaptation will allow economic policy 
efficiency to an extent not possible in very rigid settings. Excessive 
fiexibility, however, increases the risk of opportunism. 
Striking a sensible balance between these two objectives 
is therefore fundamental to accomplish high investment and 
efficient policies. The existence of independent institutions that 
constrain opportunistic behavior while allowing sufficient flexi-
bility is a key factor in attaining economic growth. Strong and 
independent courts allow legislation, regulation and long-term 
contracting with the government to be left relatively open without 
compromising investment, because private investors know their 
rights will be protected. In this way, well-functioning judicial 
systems can enhance the flexibility of economic policy without 
concerning investors that excessive discretion will allow adminis-
trative expropriation. 
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Attenuating Circumstances 
The actual impact of a malfunctioning judicial system on 
economic performance will depend on an array of complementary 
factors. 34 First, the availability of alternative mechanisms for 
securing property rights and their characteristics with respect to 
cost and effectiveness. Even in economies where judicial systems 
function properly, many companies specialize in collecting and 
selling information about other firms' and people's creditworthi-
ness. As the cost of processing information falis, so does the price 
charged for these services, even in less developed economies. 
These services allow firms in countries with weak judicial systems 
to frade and contract widely and in rather impersonal terms. 
Reputation is also a reasonably effective substitute for third-party 
contract enforcement in sectors characterized by non-atomistic 
market structures and repeated transactions, reducing the incen-
tive for opportunism. Obviously, the existence of a strong judicia-
ry will stimulate self-enforcement to be even more effective. 
Sherwood, Shepherd and Souza (1994, p. 10) note that these 
mechanisms for screening business partners and stimulating 
self-enforcement have been identified in several World Bank 
studies, and that in many instances they provide cheaper alter-
natives to stimulate compliance with the law than resorting to 
litigation. In the same fashion, alternative mechanisms are also 
available to resolve disputes without resorting to courts. An noted 
by Williamson (1995, p. 182): 
"The legal centralism tradition presumes that efficacious rules of 
law regarding contract disputes are in place and applied by the courts 
in an informed, sophisticated, and low cost way ... The facts, however, 
disclose otherwise. Most disputes - including many that under current 
rules could be brought to a court - are resolved by avoidance, self-help, 
and the like." 
A simple extension of the model discussed in the beginning 
of this section will help clarifying the role of mechanisms for 
screening business partners. Suppose in the previous model that 
some institution specializes in selling information about people's 
creditworthness. In particular, the firm in the model is able, by 
paying a fee f to reduce the probability of doing business with 
clients of type 2 from Ir to p. In this case, the expected value and 
the variance of the firm's return become: 
E(return) = r (1 - ap)-f 
ar2 = r2a2p (1 _ p) 
from which follows that the firm will operate with a rate of return 
equal to: 
r= (i+ j)/[1 - ap (1 + cd(1 - p)/p)] 
34 Note that while these factors may attenuate the impact of a malfunctioning judiciary on economic 
performance, they may be themselves the result of weak courts. 
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Table 3 gives the premium over the risk-free rate of return, 
assuming this rate (= O to be 10 percent and the fee paid by the 
firm for information about clients (= I) to be equal to 0.5 percent. 
The results in the table show that by resorting to methods that 
reduce the risk of contracting with type 2 clients, the firm is able 
to substantially reduce the social cost of weak third-party enforce-
ment. Obviously, this reduction will be more significant the less 
expensive and the more efficient (lowerf and p) are these mecha-
nisms. 
Table 3 
Risk Premium Due to Nonperforming Clients (r/i - 1, in percent) 
p = 0.02 p = 0.05 p = O. / 
a = 0.2 6.3 7.5 9.1 
a = 0.3 a = 0.5 8.4 11.4 16.0 
a = 0.8 10.5 15.7 23.8 
a = 0.2 7.2 8.9 11.2 
a = 0.6 a = 0.5 10.8 15.4 22.1 
a = 0.8 14.5 22.8 35.3 
Note: Asswning i = 10% and f = 0.5%. 
Second, the impact on growth depends on how economic 
actors react to the uncertainties created by the poor performance 
of the judiciary. If they react by raising prices to accommodate for 
a risk premium, the costs, although present, will tend to be lower, 
in terms of allocative efficiency, than if economic actors react by 
rationing quantities. For instance, if banks raise their spreads 
rather than rationing credit, resources will tend to be better 
allocated. The actual impact will depend, obviously, on the criteria 
used for rationing and on the extent of adverse selection prob-
lems. 
Third, judicial systems will have a larger impact on eco-
nomic activity if firms' performance is not already compromised 
by other problems. In highly inflationary economies, for instance, 
agents will only engage in short-terra contracting, no matter how 
independent, impartial and timely the judiciary is. In the same 
fashion, firms may vertically integrate as a result of incentives 
given by (usually import substitution) trade policies so that, no 
matter how efficient is the judiciary, specialization will be limited. 
Investment or production may also be constrained by other 
factors - e.g., lack of infrastructure - so that improving the 
judiciary will have reduced effects on production and investment. 
Fourth, North (1991) and Sherwood, Shepherd and Souza 
(1994) note how the importance of well-functioning judicial sys-
tems depend on the levei of complexity of the economy. Relatively 
unsophisticated economies engage less in contract intensive 
transactions, may rely more on social norms and trade property 
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rights that need less legal protection, so that they may do well 
without strong enforcement. More complex economies - and 
within them sectors that engage in more long-term contracting - 
produce and trade intensively in goods that are not easily exclud-
able and that may be reproduced at low cost, such as computer 
software, and therefore will benefit most from well-functioning 
legal and judicial systems. 
Finally, in what way and how much a dysfunctional judi-
cial system affects economic performance will depend on the 
extent to which state-owned enterprises participate in produc-
tion. In particular, if private firms operate only in sectors where 
transactions tend to be short-term, investment is not specific and 
self-enforcing contracts are the norm, efficiency will probably be 
hurt, but production will take place. In this case, although 
reforming the judiciary may be essential to allow privatization, it 
will not have a large impact on sectors in which private firms 
operate. There is, however, one important qualification, weak 
judiciaries will discourage investment and production in activities 
whose major client is the state. If state enterprises control a large 
part of the economy this problem will be magnified. 
Overall, we may conclude that although well-functioning 
legal and judicial systems foster growth, assessing the extent of 
this effect is a matter of empirical research. I turn to this issue 
next. 
4. Empirical Evidence 
In his lecture on industrial organization at the 50th anni-
versary of the NBER, in 1972, Ronald Coase started by remarking 
that what he found curious about the treatment of problems of 
industrial organization in economics was that it did not exist. 35 
 Something very similar may be said of the empirical analysis of 
the impact of judicial systems on economic development. In fact, 
what is curious about the treatment of this subject in the empir-
ical literature is exactly how little has been done, given the wide 
recognition of this topic's importance. 
Although more conspicuous in the case of judicial systems, 
the shortage of empirical research is a problem that affects the 
entire field of institutional economics. Because institutions 
change so slowly and are so ingrained in social, economic and 
35 Coase (1988, p. 58) used a conversation between Sherlock Holmes and Inspector Gregory to illustrate 
his point: "You may remember the occasion on which Sherlock Holmes drew the Inspector's attention 
to the 'curious incident of the dog in the nighttime.' This brought the comment from the Inspector: 
The dog did nothing in the nighttime.' Holmes then remarked: 'That was the curious incident.' I 
could not help recalling this conversation when contemplating the present state of the subject of 
industrial organization." 
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political life, actually measuring a country's institutional en-
dowment or its isolated impact on economic performance is not 
an easy task. As a consequence, while institutional economics 
has made considerable strides on the theory front, empirical 
research has lagged significantly behind. As remarked by Lin and 
Nugent (1995, p. 2,305), "the Achilles heel of the New Institutional 
Economics is the difficulty of empirical testing..." 
Most of the empirical literature on the impact on growth of 
institutions, in general, and judicial systems, in particular, is 
based on cross-country regressions. The work in this area usually 
relies on conditional convergence models, in which a low insti-
tutional endowment, in general, and weak judicial systems, in 
particular, are hypothesized to reduce the steady-state levei of per 
capita GDP and, as a consequence, the country's output growth 
rate [see Barro (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992 and 
1995)]. Several of the first studies in that area proxied the quality 
of the legal/judicial systems using either a measure of political 
instability or, less frequently, the nature of the political system. 
The rationale behind these exercises is two-fold. One, that politi-
cal instability reduces the security of property rights. In particu-
lar, that the legal and judicial systems in countries experiencing 
wars, revolutions and other forms of violent political transitions 
would be less able to secure property rights than countries 
without these sort of events. Two, that democratic regimes are 
better able to secure property rights. 
There is plenty of empirical evidence supporting the as-
sertion that political instability hampers growth [Alesina and 
Perotti (1994)]. In fact, although the early study by Hibbs (1973) 
detected little effect of political instability on growth, most of the 
recent literature concluded otherwise [e.g., Barro (1991) and 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993)]. Barro and Lee (1994), for instance, 
measured political instability using the number of revolutions, 
both successful and unsuccessful, experienced by each country 
per year, concluding that it had a negative and significant influ-
ence on growth, in the statistic and economic senses - a one-stan-
dard-deviation increase in their political-instability variable 
lowers annual growth rates by 0.3 percentage points. Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) showed that political instability reduces invest-
ment, a primary supply-source of growth, and also find convinc-
ing evidence that unequal income distribution fosters socio-political 
instability. 
Less persuasive is the evidence in favor of the hypothesis 
that democracy fosters growth. The main argument in favor of a 
positive effect of democracy on growth is that dictators cannot 
credibly commit themselves not to expropriate property rights. 
Dictatorships would then raise uncertainty and lower investment 
[North (1990) and North and Weingast (1989)]. The empirical 
evidence, however, does not seem to support this hypothesis. As 
surveyed by Alesina and Perotti (1994, p. 353), the literature "on 
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this point is fairly unanimous in finding inconclusive results. 
Controlling for the economic determinants of growth, democracy 
has no effect on growth, either positive or negative." 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) surveyed 18 studies, with 
21 results about the relationship between economic performance 
and political regimes. Five revealed no impact, eight favored 
democracy, and an equal number authoritarianism. 36 Not only is 
the empirical evidence inconclusive, but as argued by Przeworski 
and Limongi (1993) and Przeworski (1995), it suffers from serious 
statistical problems. In particular, political regimes are not exog-
enous variables, as assumed in various of these studies, so that 
the sample used in these regressions is not randomly selected. 
The lack of a significant relationship between political 
regimes and growth does not mean, of course, that these have no 
impact on the security of property rights. There are other chan-
nels linking growth and political regimes, such as lower pressure 
for immediate consumption and state autonomy, factors that may 
weight in favor of higher growth in dictatorships. But not only is 
it not clear why democracies should make it easier for the state 
to provide credible commitments - after ali, there were plenty of 
short-lived democracies and many long-lasting dictatorships -
but also the usual arguments fail to recognize that the state is 
not the sole threat to property rights: 
"The property rights literature treats the state as the only source 
of potential threat. But property rights are threatened by private actors: 
capitalist property is threatened by organized workers, landlords' prop-
erty by landless peasants. It is by no means clear that the villain is 
necessarily 'the ruler'. Indeed, one liberal dilemma is that a strong state 
is required to protect property from private encroachments but a strong 
state is a potential threat himself" (Przeworski and Limongi (1993, p. 
53)). 
More recently, different studies have tried to assess the 
impact of legal/judicial systems on economic development by 
focusing on proxies more closely linked to the security of property 
rights, policy stability and the performance of judicial systems, 
while at least partially overcoming the problem of endogeneity. 
Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995) and Brunetti and Weder 
(1995) are studies that follow this line of analysis. 
Knack and Keefer (1995) use a series of subjective mea-
sures of country risk as assessed by two private institutions and 
sold to international investors. Their results reveal an impact of 
well-functioning legal and judicial systems on countries' rate of 
investment, steady-state levei of income and GDP growth that is 
larger than previously estimated using measures of political 
violence or Gastil indices of political and civil liberties. A one-stan- 
36 According to Przeworski and Limongi (1993, p. 60). the historical panem of these results makes one 
suspicious of the role of ideology in statistics: "What is even more puzzling is that among the 11 
results published before 1988. eight found that authoritarian regimes grew faster, while none of the 
nine results published after 1987 supported this finding." 
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dard-deviation increase in Knack and Keefer's indices of property 
rights' security increases growth by about 1.2 percentage points. 
The authors conclude that securing property rights is as impor-
tant to growth as education. Knack and Keefer also fmd that their 
results "are robust to changes in sample period, sample size and 
specification." Finally, the authors conclude that protected prop-
erty rights foster economic growth not only by stimulating invest-
ment but also by increasing total factor productivity. 
Mauro (1995) uses nine different indices collected by Busi-
ness International, a private country risk evaluator, comprising 
measures of political and social stability, quality of the legal and 
judicial systems, a measure of bureaucratic interference in com-
mercial activities and the degree of corruption. Mauro's (1995) 
results suggest a negative association between corruption and 
investment and growth, which is significant in statistical and 
economic terms. He also concludes that bureaucratic efficiency 
has an impact on investment and growth that rivais with that of 
political stability. 
Brunetti and Weder (1995) look at how policy instability 
affects economic development using data collected from 310 
firms, in 28 developing countries, through a especially designed 
questionnaire. In particular, the questionnaire was intended to 
reveal entrepreneurs' assessment of "uncertainties in tax legisla-
tion, unstable regulations concerning labor contracts, uncertain 
and arbitrary decisions of courts or unclear proceedings in the 
allocation of ali sorts of licenses." Their results indicate that legal 
and policy instability reduce growth rates. However, enforcement 
instability - as gauged by the degree of transparency of the law 
enforcement process, an indicator of the prevalence of corruption 
and the degree of favoritism in the political system - shows no 
effect on growth. The authors conclude that while firms appar-
ently succeed in dealing with the discretionary power of judges 
and bureaucrats, they are not as successful in getting around the 
problems created by policy and legal uncertainty. 
Williamson's (1995) suggestion, of using the pattern of 
contracting in the economy to indirectly assess the performance 
of judicial systems, is followed by Clague et al. (1995). The authors 
use the proportion of contract-intensive money (one minus the 
ratio of currency held outside banks to M2) as a proxy for the 
intensity of transactions in the economy that require third-party 
enforcement of contract and property rights. They hypothesize, 
in addition, that because investment is dependent on this sort of 
enforcement, countries with a higher proportion of contract-in-
tensive money (CIM) should also present higher rates of invest-
ment and growth. Clague et al. (1995) fmd a positive statistically 
significant correlation between CIM and investment and, to some 
extent, also with growth. According to their estimates, a one-stan-
dard-deviation increase in CIM increases investment rates by 
more than 2.5 percentage points. Finaily, the authors conclude 
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that CIM impacts growth through its impact on investment, -but 
not through efficiency effects. 
Although the literature on cross-country growth models 
has contributed much to improve our understanding of how 
judicial and legal systems affect economic development, one 
should be aware of its limitations. Four in particular deserve 
attention. 
First, although progress has been made in recent years in 
finding better proxies, a good measure of the quality of countries' 
legal and judicial systems has not yet been found. Revolutions 
and other forms of violent political transitions have effects on the 
supply of production factors and their productivity that extend 
much beyond the security of property rights. It is not very clear, 
also, how better judiciaries could reduce policy instability result-
ing from "surprise inflation taxing, [and] unpredictable exchange 
rate and interest rate manipulations" [Borner, Brunetti and 
Weder (1992, p. 17)]. Knack and Keefer's (1995) and Mauro's 
(1995) indicators are criticized by Brunetti and Weder (1995, 
p. 5), who note that country-risk assessment is prepared mainly 
for foreign companies, focusing on risks of nationalization and 
exchange controls, and do not reflect the perception of domestic 
investors. Moreover, they remark, "the interviews with managers 
of multinational firms... revealed one common attitude towards 
business indicators. They are mostly used as one general, rather 
unimportant source of information for foreign decisions." 
Brunetti and Weder's (1995) indicators are no less prob-
lematic. Their questionnaires ask about businessmen's percep-
tions and not about their actual experience. In the same fashion, 
Clague et al.'s (1995) contract-intensive money - equal to the sum 
of checking deposits, savings and small time deposits at banks 
and thrift institutions - is constituted of sufficiently liquid assets 
to make one less than fully confident that it reflects the impor-
tance of "transactions that require third-party enforcement" in an 
economy. In addition, one may wonder how exactly to interpret 
the result that countries with large ratios between the stock of 
savings and GDP tend to present larger investment to GDP 
ratios. 37 
Second, there are serious econometric problems in the 
cross-country literature which are not always well treated. Levine 
and Renelt (1992) show that these models are very sensitive to 
specification and reject many of the explanations put forward in 
previous studies. As I have already mentioned, another serious, 
often disregarded problem is the endogeneity of many of the 
explanatory variables used as proxies of the quality of the le-
gal/judicial systems in these models. When endogeneity is con-
trolled for, the statistical significance of these proxies drop 
37 For a discussion of this point see Clague et al. (1995, p. 24-25). 
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considerably or just vanish. For instance, in Clague et al. (1995), 
when the effect of contract-intensive money on growth is es-
timated using instrumental variables it is not statistically sig-
nificant. Similar results are observed by Besley (1993), whose 
conclusion, as reported by Lin and Nugent (1995, p. 2,361), is 
worth reproducing: "the paper confirms the idea that there may 
be a link between these two (property rights and investment), but 
also cautions that issues of measurement error and endogeneity 
should not be neglected..." 
Third, many studies are also very sensitive to the sample 
used. Brunetti and Weder's (1995) sample of firms, for instance, 
is far from random. 38 The authors also report testing for their 
sample the impact of political instability - using as measures the 
number of revolutions and assassinations and Mauro's (1995) 
indicators, derived from experts surveys - obtaining, in both 
cases, a coefficient that is "clearly insignificant." In Clague et al. 
(1995) the sensitivity to sample selection shows up quite clearly 
in Table 3. When growth regressions are estimated using the 
whole sample of 102 countries, the contract-intensive money 
variable is found not to be statistically significant, in contrast with 
the result obtained using 96 countries, for which the variable is 
significant at the 5 percent levei. 
It is worth noting that sensitivity to sample selection is a 
common problem in cross-country regressions, despite the large 
number of observations normally used. Auerbach, Hasset and 
Oliner (1993) [cited in Pack (1994, p. 57)] show that De Long and 
Summers's (1991) finding that returns to investment in equip-
ment surpass that to other sorts of investment do not resist a 
marginal change in their sample: "the differential returns to 
equipment and other investment may be an artifact. Omitting 
Botswana from the set of observations leads to coefficients for 
equipment and structures that are similar " Another example is 
Cukierman and Webb's (1995, p. 42) conclusion that central bank 
independence fosters growth: 
"With a full sample of countries, nonpolitical turnover of central 
bank governors has a marginally significant positive sign, contrary to 
priors. Brazil, Korea and Botswana are outliers, however, because they 
achieved high growth rates despite central bank turnover and high 
vulnerability. With those countries excluded, the six-month vulnerabil-
ity indicator has a significantly negative sign. This fmding supports the 
view that, other things being equal, higher political dependence of 
central bank tends to retard growth in most countries" (the emphasis 
is mine). 
38 Brunetti and Weder's (1995, p. 9) questionnaires, directed at private sector entrepreneurs, were 
distributed in 1992 in Spanish and English versions "as broadly as possible in Latin American, Asian 
and African LDCs. The recipients were local, private firms in LDCs that Swiss embassies, some 
multinational companies and a private development foundation could mediate." Only countries for 
which at least three completely filled out questionnaires were returned were used in the analysis. 
The sample is therefore hardly random, and results may be biased both as a result of how firms 
were initially selected and due to self-selection bias. 
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Fourth, legal and judicial systems' quality is only one 
among many competing explanations for observed differences in 
countries' growth and investment rates, all tested and not-rejected 
using cross-country regression models. Several studies have 
explored a trade-related explanation [e.g., Michalopoulos and Jay 
(1973), Feder (1983), Levine and Renelt (1992) and Harrison 
(1996)], others a link through financial markets [Fry (1982)], 
central bank independence [Cukierman and Webb (1995)], the 
quality and stability of macroeconomic policies [e.g., Kormendi 
and Meguirre (1985), Ramey and Ramey (1995) and Bleaney 
(1996)], the profile of investment [De Long and Summers (1991)], 
the participation of the state in production [Yoder, Borlçholder 
and Friedên (1991) and Plane (1992)). Although they all rejected 
the hypotheses that their explanation for growth differentials does 
not matter, with exception of one, they have not tested the power 
of their arguments against competing hypotheses. Levine and 
Renelt's (1992, p. 959) assessment of this literature may be 
summarized as follows: 
"(E)ach of these studies uses an assortment of theoretical papers 
to motivate a variety of economic variables that are then used in 
cross-country growth regressions. Although each study presents intui-
tively appealing results, they use different explanatory variables.... this 
paper systematically evaluates the robustness of the partial correlation 
between per capita growth rates and a wider assortment of economic 
indicators than any previous study. We find that very few economic 
variables are robustly correlated with cross-country growth rates or the 
ratio of investment expenditures to GDP." 
Pack (1994) presents some other pertinent qualifications 
to results derived from cross-country models, including the fact 
that they all impose very stringent assumptions about interna-
tional production functions. Therefore, he cautions that although 
cross-country regressions help to systematize basic facts about 
growth and to indicate which may be more important, they should 
not be interpreted as implying causality. 39 As remarked by Romer 
(1994, p. 19): "In evaluating different models of growth, I have 
found that Lucas's (1988) observation, that people with human 
capital migrate from places where it is scarce to places where it 
is abundant, is as powerful a piece of evidence as all the cross-
country regressions combined." 
Interestingly, I have not found studies adopting two other 
methodologies that could be useful to assess the economic costs 
of malfunctioning judicial systems. The first of these consists of 
developing computable general equilibrium models and using 
them to assess the impact of a change in the quality of judicial 
and legal systems. This type of methodology is commonly used to 
asses the effect of trade policies [e.g., Srinivasan and Whalley 
39 In particular, cross-country regressions are hardly evidence enough to warrant conclusions as 
Scully's (1992, p. xiii-viv): "The Anglo-American paradigm of free men and free markets unleashed 
human potential to an extent unparalleled in history... One needs evidence to persuade those who 
see promise in extensive government intervention in the economy. I have found such evidence. and 
the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of the paradigm of classical liberalism." [as cited in Przeworski 
and Limongi (1993, p. 60)]. 
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(1986)1, to appraise the impact of public policy on income dis-
tribution [Taylor et al. (1980)1, and so on. 40 To use CGEs to 
examine this sort of problem, one would need a model and an idea 
of how and to what degree improving the judiciary would affect 
people's behavior. For instance, an improvement in the judiciary 
could reduce interest rate spreads by 1 percentage point, shift the 
demand for labor by 10 percent etc. These effects could then be 
introduced in the model and be used to measure their overall 
impact on output, income distribution etc. 
There are three "problems" with this sort of methodology. 
One is its complexity. These models consist of thousands of 
equations and variables, and developing them requires a large 
amount of data and computer programming. Another is that, 
contrary to what happens with trade models, several of the 
elasticities may not be estimated econometrically. To overcome 
this problem, one may resort to contingent valuation or similar 
methods of measurement. 41 A third problem is that to fully assess 
the impact of reforming judicial systems one has to build some 
dynamics into the model. Otherwise, only static, once and for ali 
gains will be measured. 
An alternative, complementary strand of research is to do 
detailed country studies. Sherwood, Shepherd and Souza (1994, 
p. 18) suggest, for instance, to research the experience of coun-
tries undergoing significant reforms, as happened to the former 
socialist countries and is bounded to happen with Hong Kong. 
But even in countries where transitions have not been so pro-
nounced a deep analysis may uncover important evidence. China 
is a case in point. As reported by Perkins (1994, p. 34): 42 
"At first glance, China's success in attracting foreign investment is 
a puzzle. After ali, foreign investors have traditionally had little security 
in China. China does not have a strong legal tradition; in fact, lawyers 
and most commercial law were abolished during the Cultural Revolu-
tion. The system after 1976 had to be rebuilt from scratch, and the new 
laws were not very reliable protection against official assaults on foreign 
property rights. Whatever one's legal rights of ownership, official sup-
port was required to gain access to state controlled inputs such as 
electricity, foreign exchange, or railroad transport.... After the political 
crisis caused by the events of Tiananmen on June 4, 1989, there was 
even reason for foreign investors to expect a reversion to more bureau-
cratic controls over the economy, not fewer. And yet foreign investment 
continued to rise." 
40 See Gunning and Kuzzer (1995, Section 3), for examples of policy assessments using CGE models. 
41 See Sherwood, Shepherd and Souza (1994, p. 17-19). 
42 Shapiro and Taylor (1990, p. 866) call attention to another, less obvious, but equally interesting 
case; the U.S.: "During the industrialization push in ali now-rich countries, public interventions 
were rife. Horowitz (1977) shows that US courts restricted individuais' control over property; 
decisions carne to favor community property over absolute domain... The Handlins (1969) and Hartz 
(1948) demonstrate that although they were constrained by the constitution in their choice of 
instruments, US state legislatures controlled exports and granted monopoly power to public 
corporations." 
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5. Final Remarks 
There is persuasive evidence that well-functioning judicial 
systems foster economic growth. By securing property and con-
tract rights, reducing policy instability and curbing adminis-
trative expropriation, impartial, timely and predictable judiciaries 
stimulate investment, efficiency and technological progress. Yet, 
despite the consensus about the importance of good judiciaries 
for economic development, judicial system reform in developing 
and transition economies has been slow, and in some cases has 
not started at ali. In particular, it has lagged much behind other 
reforms, such as trade liberalization, privatization and, in some 
countries, social security reform. 
Haussman (1996) explores different reasons for this lack 
of progress. First, there is no clear and well-defined alternative 
being proposed, neither as to where exactly to move to, nor as to 
how to get there. On the contrary, judicial reform is perceived as 
a leap in the dark. Risk averse actors resist change in favor of 
maintaining the status quo. Also important, many of the proposed 
changes are advocated as turn-key reforms, disregarding coun-
tries' specific institutional endowments. The lack of a well-defined 
alternative is not a coincidence. As I have tried to show, the 
literature does not provide a clear-cut definition of what is a good 
judiciary, with issues of efficiency and justice often getting mixed 
up. Ultimately, striking a balance between these contending 
objectives will require a political, rather than a technical solution. 
Second, society is relatively adapted to the current system, 
lacks a clear view of how costly it is, and realizes that the 
necessary reforms will take time and much political effort. Over-
all, the levei of discontentment with the current situation is much 
lower than what was observed with macroeconomic instability. 
There is, therefore, a tendency to postpone the reform. This is the 
result of two factors. One, many costs are borne by taxpayers in 
general, rather than privately. These costs get lost in the middle 
of other, much larger public expenditures. Two, the bulk of the 
social cost of a malfunctioning judiciary is a hidden cost. It results 
much more from investments and business deals that do not take 
place, or that are done inefficiently, than from expenditures with 
litigation. In addition, there are private substitutes for securing 
property rights and resoiving disputes that mitigate the impor-
tance of dysfunctional judicial systems. 
Third, in most countries, reforming the judicial system 
means passing from a system designed to satisfy the producers 
of justice to one targeted at benefiting its consumers [The 
Econornist (1996)]. The problem is that while the losses to pro-
ducers are clear, immediate and concentrated, the benefits for 
consumers are spreaded thinly among the population, are not 
evident and will only be entirely felt in the long run. 
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There are several groups bound to lose from judicial re-
form. First, the bureaucracy in charge of the system and people 
who make a living out of providing facilities and speeding up 
judicial processes - in countries where corruption is pervasive, 
interests are even more pronounced. Second, providers of sub-
stitutes are also interested. 43 Third, the litigant lawyers. Fourth, 
the firms and private agents that benefit from dysfunctional 
judicial system: firms that are able to postpone tax payment and 
reduce payroll taxes by resorting to courts; insurance companies 
that gain from postponing payment to clients; tenants who are 
able to pay low rents without risking eviction; squatters in rural 
and urban sites; not to mention people involved in ilegal and 
criminal activities. 
While costs are up front and concentrated in specific 
groups, the beneficiary is the population at large. It is not even 
clear how different groups will be affected. In Brazil, for instance, 
private firms suffer from lack of protection from administrative 
discretion, but on the other hand benefit from the opportunity to 
delay payment of taxes. No one knows how the two balance out. 
In addition, as noted by Haussman (1996, p. 45): "en la medida 
que la reforma es un proceso de ensayo y error, elo puede 
postergar y hacer menos transparente la aparición de beneficios 
tangibles para grupos cuyo apoyo politico es decisivo." 
One of the means through which malfunctioning judiciaries 
impact economic activity is by stimulating more interventionist 
economic policies. In many sectors, notably in infrastructure, 
public production is partly explained by the lack of interest from 
private investors, afraid of administrative expropriation and in-
sufficient protection from the judiciary. As developing and tran-
sition economies adopted market-oriented policies, especially 
privatization, judicial reform becomes critical to allow these coun-
tries to succeed in attracting private investment. This, however, 
raises the issue of how to sequence reforms. The literature is not 
conclusive. North (1992, p. 27), for instance, observes that: 
"There edsts no theory of the dynamics of polity evolution that can 
guide the policy maker in the many current restructuring efforts that 
are ongoing in the developing and formerly socialist economies. But the 
dilemma is straightforward enough. Slow, incremental change will be 
sabotaged by the creation of "corruption rights" by the edsting bureauc-
racy. The policy implication is that radical alterations in policy should 
be accompanied by radical restructuring of the bureaucracy. But this 
will only be possible where the existing underlying ideology and resul-
tant informal constraints are at least partially complementary to the 
creation of more efficient property rights. Economies without a heritage 
of informal institutions and ideological perceptions to enable them to 
adjust to the stresses and strains of impersonal markets, competition, 
and other institutional consequences that flow from the technological 
imperatives of the second economic revolution simply cannot adjust 
overnight." 
43 Ryterman et al. (1996. p. 14), for instance, mentions that lack of well-functioning judicial systems 
led to widespread barter transactions in Russia, and to "the rise of intermediaries whose sole reason 
for existence seems to be as guarantor of complicated barter transactions." 
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Levy and Spiller (1994) take a similar stand, arguing that 
in many countries judicial and other related reforms should 
preceed the privatization of public utilities. According to them, a 
proper institutional structure has to be in place before privatiza-
tion can be successfully implemented in sectors such as telecom-
munications. The opposite view is defended, however, by Hay, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1996). They argue that, especially in transi-
tion economies, privatization and other liberal reforms are neces-
sary to created interested parties in judicial reform. Therefore, 
they argue, the judicial system reform - including the courts, 
prosecutors and the police - should not be the starting point, 
since it is likely to take a long time. Rather, reform should be 
initially targeted at making the judicial and legal systems more 
competitive, by trying to adapt them to business practices. 44 
Overall, an important conclusion is that although there are 
many channels through which malfunctioning judicial systems 
affect growth, the actual impact and its nature will depend on two 
sets of factors. The first concerns the types of problems faced. 
That is, are courts biased, or unpredictable or just slow, but 
otherwise fair and predictable. Unfairness, because it affects 
justice, and unpredictability, because it affects the incentive to 
seek justice, are probably the worst problems. Slowness, however, 
may also become a key problem if it stimulates agents to behave 
opportunistically. The other set of factors include the availability 
and quality of substitutes, the compledty of the economy and the 
existence of other policy shortcomings that limit investment and 
reduce efficiency. 
Assessing the actual impact of dysfunctional judicial sys-
tem on growth is, therefore, a matter of empirical research. The 
review of the empirical literature conducted in this paper leads 
us to three different conclusions. First, that almost all evidence 
is based on cross-country regression models of investment and 
growth, that use different proxies for the quality of legal and 
judicial systems. Two, that most studies suggest that dysfunc-
tional legal and judicial systems seriously compromise invest-
ment and growth. Third, that cross-country regression models, 
although useful tools to elicit stylized facts and rough orders of 
magnitude ofwhere to look for explanations for growth differentials, 
in general suffer from important econometric problems. Although 
there are many suggestive stories, there is very little hard evidence 
outside these cross-country regression models. To get a better 
assessment of the cost of malfunctioning judicial systems, es-
pecially estimates that may be used to raise support for judicial 
reform, it is essential to embark on detailed individual country 
studies. 
44 See also Cooter (1996). 
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CEP 20001-970 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ 
Telex: (21)34110/21857 - Tel.: (021) 277-7447 
Fax: (021) 220-7909 
BNDESPAR - BNDES Participações S.A. 
Av. República do Chile, 100 - 20 2 andar 
Caixa Postal 469 
CEP 20001-970 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ 
Telex: (21)34110/21857 - Tel.: (021) 277-7447 
Fax: (021) 220-5874 
Escritórios 
Brasília 
Setor Bancário Sul - Quadra 1 - Bloco E 
Ed. BNDES - 13 2 andar 
CEP 70076-900 - Brasília - DF 
Telex: (61) 1190 - Tel.: (061) 225-4350 
Fax: (061) 225-5179 
São Paulo 
Av. Paulista, 460 - 13 2 andar 
CEP 01310-000 - São Paulo - SP 
Telex: (11) 35568 - Tel.: (011) 251-5055 
Fax: (011) 251-5917 
Recife 
Rua Antonio Lumack do Monte, 96 - 6 2 andar 
Ed. Empresarial Center II 
CEP 51020-350 - Recife - PE 
Tel.: (081) 465-7222 
Fax: (081) 465-7861 
